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Abstract
Humans can easily describe, imagine, and, crucially, predict a wide variety of behaviors
of liquids–splashing, squirting, gushing, sloshing, soaking, dripping, draining, trickling,
pooling, and pouring–despite tremendous variability in their material and dynamical
properties. Here we propose and test a computational model of how people perceive and
predict these liquid dynamics, based on coarse approximate simulations of fluids as
collections of interacting particles. Our model is analogous to a “game engine in the
head”, drawing on techniques for interactive simulations (as in video games) that
optimize for efficiency and natural appearance rather than physical accuracy. In two
behavioral experiments, we found that the model accurately captured people’s
predictions about how liquids flow among complex solid obstacles, and was significantly
better than two alternatives based on simple heuristics and deep neural networks. Our
model was also able to explain how people’s predictions varied as a function of the
liquids’ properties (e.g., viscosity and stickiness). Together, the model and empirical
results extend the recent proposal that human physical scene understanding for the
dynamics of rigid, solid objects can be supported by approximate probabilistic
simulation, to the more complex and unexplored domain of fluid dynamics.
Author summary
Although most people struggle to learn physics in school, every human brain is a
remarkable “intuitive physicist” when it comes to the quick, unconscious judgments we
make in interacting with the world. Without effort, and with surprisingly high
quantitative accuracy, we can judge when a plate placed near the edge of a table might
be at risk of falling, or how far a glass filled with a certain amount of water can be
tipped before the water is in danger of spilling. What kinds of computations in the
brain support these abilities? We suggest an answer based on probabilistic inference
operating over particle-based simulations, the same class of approximation methods
used in video games to simulate convincing real-time interactions between objects in a
virtual environment. This hypothesis can potentially account for people’s quantitative,
graded judgments in diverse and novel situations including a wide array of materials
and physical properties, without positing a large number of separate systems or
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heuristics. Here, we build on previous evidence that a system of approximate
probabilistic simulation supports judgments about rigid objects (e.g. judging the
stability of towers of blocks, as in the game Jenga), and ask whether people can also
make systematic and accurate predictions about flowing and splashing liquids, such as
water or honey. We show that it is possible to capture people’s quantitative predictions
using a computational model that approximates the true underlying fluid dynamics to
varying degrees of coarseness, and find that people’s responses are most consistent with
a very coarse approximation; while typical engineering applications might use tens or
hundreds of thousands of particles to simulate a fluid, the brain might get by with
roughly a hundred particles. Furthermore, we find that people consistently
underestimate the potential energy of a splashing liquid in our virtual scenes, and that
our model captures this behavior.
Introduction
From a glance at liquid flowing into a glass (Fig 1A), you can infer a great deal: it is
pouring rapidly, likely from a spout or small opening; it is not viscous; little will likely
splash out, although if the angle of the glass were lowered slightly, perhaps much more
might escape. Even young children can perceive and interact with liquids in motion
(Fig 1B) in ways well beyond the capabilities of modern robots and artificial intelligence
(AI) systems. How do people draw rich intuitions about liquids? What is the nature of
people’s implicit knowledge of liquid dynamics? By what mechanisms is this knowledge
applied to support their everyday interactions with liquids?
A growing body of evidence supports the view that humans have rich knowledge of
everyday rigid body physics, which inform their predictions, inferences, and planning
through a system of probabilistic inference [1–7]. [3] proposed a cognitive mechanism for
physical scene understanding based on “approximate probabilistic simulation”. They
posited that objects’ spatial geometry and physical attributes, as well as certain laws of
mechanics, are represented approximately, and support fast, efficient probabilistic
judgments over short time scales via small numbers of simulations based on sampled
estimates of the underlying world state. Their model of human cognition’s “intuitive
physics engine” explained people’s physical predictions about stability and support
relationships, and the motion of objects under gravity, across a wide range of rigid body
scenes.
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Fig 1. (A) Dynamic fluids are very complex, yet ubiquitous in everyday scenes. (B)
Humans–even young children–can reason about and interact with liquids effectively.
Here we explore how people understand physical scenes involving fluids moving
around rigid objects, modeling their judgments as being driven by, in part, some form of
approximate probabilistic simulations. We asked three related questions: How well can
people predict the behavior of liquids in complex scenes? How well can approximate
simulation-based models account for people’s quantitative predictions across a range of
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Fig 2. Experimental stimuli. (A) Examples of water and honey stimuli from Experiment 1
after gravity was applied. (B) Examples of water and honey stimuli from Experiment 2.
(Subjects only saw liquid in motion as part of the practice phase, and otherwise only saw a
static image of the liquid in its starting position.)
scenes and different kinds of liquids? How do people’s uncertainty and computational
resource limitations influence their judgments? We tackled these questions by probing
people’s predictive judgments in two psychophysical experiments, and comparing human
predictions to five different models, including four different kinds of simulation-based
models varying in their computational complexity and physical assumptions, and a
simple neural network alternative that approaches the problem as a pattern recognition
task, using a deep convolutional network of the kind that has recently been successful in
many computer vision applications. We examined how well people’s predictions
matched each model, and how they co-varied with each model as a function of liquid
properties, such as viscosity and stickiness.
Our experiments asked human participants to predict how a liquid would flow
through and around complex arrangements of obstacles (Figure 2). We used two related
tasks representative of different kinds of real-world judgments. In the first experiment
(example stimuli shown in Figure 2A), participants were asked to predict what
percentage of the liquid would end up on the right side of the divider. In the second
experiment (example stimuli shown in Figure 2B), participants were asked what
percentage would end up in the cup. In each experiment, we used computer-animated
liquid stimuli with both water-like and honey-like properties. This allowed us to test
both people’s abilities to predict flow for a range of different everyday liquids, and
different models’ abilities to capture human intuitions across that range.
We compared people’s judgments to a spectrum of simulation-based computational
models, as well as a neural network alternative. Our two most sophisticated models are
particle simulation models inspired by approximations to physics-based models used in
computer graphics, video games, and computational fluid dynamics: the “Intuitive
Fluids Engine” (IFE) model, based on smooth particle hydrodynamics (Figure 3), is the
most physically appropriate for our tasks, although it is also the most computationally
complex. The other physics-based simulation account, “MarbleSim”, is similar but uses
rigid body interactions between particles. We also consider a heuristic dynamic
simulation model (“SimpleSim”) that is computationally simpler than either
physics-based model, and an even simpler heuristic simulator (the “Gravity heuristic”)
that is not based on a dynamic simulation at all, but only on the geometric principle
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that particles under gravity move downwards unless blocked by obstacles. All the
dynamics-based models had degrees of freedom permitting them to make more
water-like or honey-like predictions, and we explored to what extent varying these
parameters could let these models capture people’s varying intuitions for these different
kinds of liquids.
To preview our results, we found that the more physically motivated particle-based
simulation models provided the best single account of people’s predictions across all our
experimental conditions. These models offer a general-purpose computational account
of how people predict the motion of fluids on short time scales, in a similar spirit to [3]’s
approximate probabilistic simulation models of intuitive physics for solid rigid bodies.
The flowing liquids in our experimental scenes are much more complex, with far more
degrees of freedom, than the rigid body systems on which [3]’s original “intuitive physics
engine” work focused, but our “intuitive fluids engine” (IFE) model is developed in a
similar spirit. The model is based on a commonly used method for simulating fluids,
based on collections of dynamic, interacting particles, which is theoretically appealing
on several grounds: It can capture a wide variety of materials by varying the specific
interaction rules, it includes natural methods for adjusting the computational resource
demands by varying the number of particles and complexity of their interactions, and it
is relatively simple compared to alternative physical simulation methods. However,
while real liquids are much more complex than rigid solids, a main contribution of the
present paper is to demonstrate that highly approximate methods for simulating fluids
may still be sufficient for the every-day kinds of predictions that people make, and that
these approximations may still be cognitively and computationally plausible. Particles
are an intuitive idea for simulating physical systems that is useful across a range of
physical scales. Real fluids are composed of on the order of 1023 particles (molecules)
per kilogram. Physics, engineering, and graphics applications may use on the order of
105 up to 107 particles to achieve sufficiently realistic simulations [8, 9], depending on
the specific application. Particle systems are also commonly employed in game engines
that must support liquids and soft bodies alongside rigid bodies highly efficiently, to
allow for user interactions in real time, even on small mobile devices. A small number of
particles (103-104) can achieve sufficiently accurate and stable simulations for the
purposes of many computer and mobile games. Here, by contrast, we show that human
data is best-accounted with on the order of a hundred particles, 102, or even fewer.
Thus brains may have evolved representations for intuitive simulation of fluids similar to
those used in contemporary computer simulations, but trading off accuracy for
computational efficiency to an extreme that goes well beyond even the most severe
short-cuts taken in conventional engineering applications.
Background of related research. We study the judgments people make about
complex physical dynamics – liquid flow – in rich, realistically rendered scenes. This is
very different from the highly simplified and abstract stimuli studied in some of the
classic work on intuitive psychology in the cognitive psychology literature. Also, our
focus on people’s ability to make sophisticated quantitative physical predictions in
complex everyday scenes [3, 7] may appear incongruous next to classic studies of
intuitive physics that emphasized ways in which people’s judgments about simple
scenarios of objects in motion can be inconsistent with even very basic principles of
Newtonian mechanics [10]. In part this is just a difference in emphasis: We are
interested in explaining how people make successful predictions in complex everyday
interactive settings, capacities that no robot, computer vision or AI system currently
comes close to, rather than the mistakes people make in much simpler settings which
are important for formal physics education but not necessarily for everyday physical
interaction with the world. It is important to note, however, that even in previous work
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which emphasized the failures of people’s physical intuitions, it was often the case that a
majority or plurality of participants’ judgments in many of the classic studies were
consistent with Newtonian principles or approximate Newtonian simulations [10–13]; it
is just the striking patterns of error which occurred in some cases that were presented as
the main findings. With some exceptions [11], the classic literature often focused on
textbook-style problems, typically presented with static, illustrated diagrams, and
requiring participants to draw out future trajectories on paper. In contrast, recent
literature has focused on more perceptual and perceptual-motor judgments, typically
with rich dynamic displays and implicit inferences about what will happen next over
short time scales (but see also, e.g. [14] for older examples). Recently, [5] even
replicated [15]’s results showing that people’s drawings of predicted ballistic motion are
often very inaccurate, but found that when those same participants were tasked with an
interactive task of intercepting a moving object or releasing it to fall with a desired
trajectory, their predictions were consistent with Newtonian dynamics. Most relevant to
the present work, [12] found that subjects were better at judging the trajectory of water
exiting a hose than a ball exiting a curved tube, hinting toward a crucial difference in
physical predictions with fluids when people can access representations they have
developed from their everyday interactions.
These and other findings [16] are beginning to coalesce on an explanation of why
people’s physical intuitions appear to vary greatly in their accuracy: higher-level,
deliberate reasoning about physics differs markedly from physical knowledge available to
lower-level perceptual and motor systems. We speculate that higher-level systems,
which are more flexible, not specific to physical reasoning, and based more on learning,
may not benefit from the perceptual conditions and reward incentives that give rise to
accurate physical knowledge in lower-level systems. Hence, our underlying hypothesis is
that there are multiple systems supporting physical scene understanding, one of which is
physical simulation. The purpose of this work is not to explore the boundaries between
the different cognitive mechanisms for understanding physical systems, but rather to
provide the first examination of mental simulation as an account of people’s ability to
predict fluid flow in realistic situations, and to develop the first computational models
of these simulation abilities that can capture to a reasonable first approximation how
people might make these predictions.
Previous artificial intelligence research on reasoning about fluids has often pursued
qualitative [17–21] or logical [18, 22] approaches, which are computationally efficient,
and were developed prior to more recent hardware and algorithmic advances that
support fluid simulation in real-time on mobile devices. Qualitative and logical models
have been especially useful in situations that ask for explicit reasoning about a range of
physical systems that people do not have much direct perceptual-motor experience with
(such as thermodynamic or hydrodynamic systems or electrical networks). More
recently, [18] developed a system of reasoning using first-order logic to draw conclusions
about transferring liquid from one container to another in theoretical, two-dimensional
scenarios. A key advantage of this approach is that it can be applied even when no
numerical information about container geometries, relative distances, initial conditions
or volume of the water, pouring speed, etc. is available. At the same time, however, it is
unclear how these qualitative or logical models could account for the fine-grained
quantitative judgments that participants make in the perceptual settings we study here.
A final class of classic AI approaches to intuitive physics is analogical simulation,
e.g., [23] devised an analogical particle-based fluid simulator, whose particles
“communicate” with each other based on a set of eight rules (see Fig 4C). This approach
combines some aspects of qualitative reasoning and quantitative, physics-engine-based
simulations, and can be seen as a simpler, more heuristic version of physically based
simulations. Most recently, deep neural networks have been proposed as a very different
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approach to making physical predictions on short time scales [24]. Both analogical
simulation and neural network approaches can be applied to our tasks, and we evaluate
simple versions of both on our experimental data, in addition to the more quantitative
approximate simulation models we have focused on.
Proponents of qualitative approaches have also argued that solving problems that
involve predicting fluid motion “to a high degree of accuracy involves computational
fluid dynamics” and “it is quite unlikely that we are capable of performing such a
prodigious feat mentally” [25]. But it is still unclear to what extent qualitative
approaches can acount for people’s sophisticated capacity for understanding and
interacting with a wide variety of fluids and fluid-like materials in everyday settings.
Furthermore, there are strong reasons to believe fluid simulation in the brain is not
prohibitively expensive. Particle simulations can be run in parallel on GPUs, and as we
argue here, the brain may be able to get by with just a coarse approximation for its
purposes. Such simulations require computation that is on par (or less) than that used
by today’s deep neural networks for computer vision [26], which are thought to be
reasonable models of parts of biological visual processing [27]. In addition, [28]’s recent
”interaction networks” and [29]’s ”neural physics engine” models introduce neural
networks which operate on objects and relations, and can learn very accurate
quantitative physical simulators from data. In light of this, as well as the mounting
evidence that human predictions and inferences about rigid physical objects is
supported by simulation, we believe it is plausible that humans perform quantitative
simulations, and not justifiable to dismiss this possibility out of hand.
Some psychological work in vision has looked at how humans perceive liquid
viscosity, and has also been skeptical of the sort of computations we propose. For
example, [30,31] argue that perception of liquids relies on superficial cues, and show that
people use certain statistical motion cues to predict viscosity. Furthermore, they argue
that, “Given that the liquid image motion is a result of...complex physical processes, it
seems practically impossible for the visual system to infer the underlying physical
movements of particles from observed movements using inverse optics computations.”
We do not disagree that surface appearance cues can be important in how people
perceive liquid properties. However, such cues alone cannot directly explain how people
can predict the motion of liquids, which is the focus of our experimental work.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first present our simulation
model and the particle-based simulation method it uses, followed by several alternative
models, including simpler simulation alternatives, as well as deep neural networks. We
then present Experiment 1, which demonstrates that participants are coarsely able to
predict the complex physics of both scenes involving low-viscosity liquids (e.g., water)
and scenes involving high-viscosity liquids (e.g., honey), and explores the roles of
damping (see Intuitive fluids engine) and uncertainty in our model’s correspondence to
participants’ judgments. Experiment 2 then focuses more directly on people’s sensitivity
to viscosity. Finally, we discuss implications of both experiments and directions for
future work.
Materials and methods
Models
Physical simulation
Smoothed-particle hydrodynamics. Our computational cognitive model is built
on a particle-based approach to simulating fluids. We define simulation as a process
that applies fixed rules iteratively, over a sequence of steps, to approximately predict a
system’s state over time. The specifics of the simulation algorithm in our model is not
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crucial to our theory; it implements the general principles that a fluid’s density is
approximated as particles, that dynamics of the fluid correspond to the approximately
Newtonian dynamics of the individual particles, that the fluid properties (e.g., viscosity,
stickiness, etc.) are distinguished by different rules for how the particles interact, and
that prediction precision and computational resource demands trade off by varying the
numbers of particles, temporal resolution of the simulated time steps, and complexity of
the particle dynamics and interaction rules.
A
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For each time step:
    For each particle:
        1. Compute density
        2. Compute pressure
        3. Compute viscous damping
        4. Compute accelerationB
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Fig 3. SPH overview. (A) How SPH approximates a fluid. For any location in the fluid,
marked “X” on the diagram, particles in the local neighborhood are used to approximate the
fluid’s, density, pressure, and dynamics at that point. The bell-shaped envelope depicts the
strength of each neighbor’s influence on the approximation, which falls off with distance. (B)
SPH simulations can be allocated more resources to achieve more precise approximations. In
the second and third panels, more particles are allocated than in the first, which will result in
more accurate and stable simulated fluid dynamics. (C ) The rules by which particles interact
can be varied to produce different qualitative fluids and materials. The first three panels show
differences in splashing behavior as a function of viscosity. The fourth panel shows a
non-Newtonian fluid that sticks to rigid surfaces (like honey).
There are various classes of fluid simulators one could choose, such as volumetric,
particle-based, or more qualitative, which all have in common the property of a time
step. Within each broad class, there are various possible implementations. As a starting
point, here we choose to explore one particular particle-based method. One possible
concern regarding the cognitive plausibility of fluid simulation models is the choice of
time-step resolution. The particular implementation we use requires a relatively fine
time step for stability (0.0002 seconds). But others have implemented stable simulations
with the same method using a substantially larger time step of 0.01 seconds, which is
sufficient for real-time user interaction with hundreds of particles on a mobile device.
Other particle-based simulation methods achieve stability with similarly large time
steps [32].
Here we use smoothed-particle hydrodynamics (SPH) [33], a method from
computational fluid dynamics, as the core algorithm for our model. SPH is used widely
in graphics and video games for approximating the dynamics of many types of
compressible and incompressible fluids (e.g., liquids and gases). The state of the fluid is
represented by a set of particles at discrete time steps. Each particle carries information
about a volume of fluid in a particular locality in space, including its position, velocity,
density, pressure, and mass. On each simulation time step, the particles’ densities and
pressures are computed, which are then used to update the accelerations, velocities and
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positions. A particle’s density is calculated by interpolating its neighbors’ densities,
weighted by their distances, ρi =
Ni∑
j=1
mW (rij , h), where ρi is the density at particle i’s
location, m is the mass of each particle, W is the kernel function, and rij is the distance
between particles i and j (Fig 3A). The weighting is determined by W , which has a
cutoff radius, h, beyond which particles have no influence. After computing particle i’s
density, its pressure is updated, followed by particle-particle friction damping forces
(analogous to viscosity). Its acceleration is a linear combination of the pressure and
damping, the velocity update is proportional to the acceleration, and the position
update is proportional to the velocity.
The precision of the liquid simulation can be adjusted by how many particles are
used: with more particles, the simulated liquid’s movement is more closely matched to
that of a real liquid (Fig 3B). But increasing the number of particles also increases the
computational cost of the simulation, thus effecting a trade-off between efficiency and
accuracy.
Intuitive fluids engine. Our simulation-based cognitive model, which we term the
“intuitive fluids engine” (IFE), is analogous to [3]’s intuitive physics engine (IPE), but is
capable of predicting a fluid’s dynamics. It posits that when the brain observes the
initial conditions of a physical scene that contains fluids, it instantiates a corresponding
particle-based simulation (i.e., SPH) to predict future states of the scene. SPH
comprises a family of related particle-based algorithms, and our implementation is
similar to the most popular versions. Our model takes as input the configuration of the
scene, including the solid elements and the fluid’s spatial state and material attributes,
such as particle friction (α) and particle stickiness. The number of particles, N , that are
instantiated can be varied as a means of adjusting the computational resources
allocated to the simulation.
Inconsistency between people’s mental simulations and ground truth physics (or our
model’s approximation thereof) may come from two different sources: perceptual
uncertainty and incorrect physical assumptions. We explored both of these possibilities
in our model. Our task required predicting how water will splash, falling under the full
acceleration of gravity. Such splashes are energetic and happen on small time scales,
and therefore it should be difficult for people to predict their details exactly. We
suspect that people may somehow “slow down” the fluid in order to try to predict
splashes in more detail, or may simply underestimate the potential energy of the liquid.
We explored this possibility by incorporating a damping term into the IFE simulations.
This term decreases the acceleration in each particle at every time step by a fixed
proportion, ζ, of that particle’s current velocity, resulting in a liquid that falls more
slowly and splashes less energetically. Values of ζ were discretized to a spacing of 1.0
(i.e. we simulated 21 different values of ζ between ζ = 0 and ζ = 20).
In prior work [34], we explored a model of perceptual uncertainty that randomly
perturbed the initial position of the fluid and averaged the outcome over many random
draws, but did not consider potentially incorrect physical assumptions. Here our
model’s uncertainty is implemented by averaging the predictions made over a small
range of damping values (where σ represents the size of the range). Thus, σ = 0
represents a deterministic IFE and σ 6= 0 represents a probabilistic IFE.
In our simulations of the stimuli, a liquid was initially positioned at the top of the
scene, then moved downward under the force of gravity through a set of solid obstacles,
and accumulated in one or more containers at the bottom. In Experiment 1, the bottom
was divided into two equally sized basins, left and right. The model’s judgments, J ,
took values between 0 and 1, where 0 represented all liquid flowing into the left basin,
and 1 represented all flowing into the right, i.e.: J = nright/N , where N was the total
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number of particles, and nright was the number that flowed into the right basin. In
Experiment 2, there was a cup positioned at the bottom of the scene and J = 1
represented all the liquid accumulating inside the cup, while J < 1 indicated some
liquid collected in the bottom of the scene, outside of the cup. We also computed
predictions from a “ground truth” model which did not include uncertainty or damping,
and which used a single, deterministic simulation with a high number of particles and
the correct viscosity, to predict the liquid behavior as accurately as possible. We
emphasize, however, that what we call ground truth here is still an approximation to
true physics, but should in theory be more accurate.
We created different SPH liquids with particle friction values that ranged from low
(approximating water) to high (approximating honey). However, high viscosity
Newtonian liquids behave differently than real honey, because they do not stick to
surfaces (SPH particles collide with obstacle surfaces as inelastic spheres, while real
fluids have much more complex boundary interactions). Fig 3C reports particle friction
values, α, for various liquids. Our α corresponds to that in the artificial viscosity term
of [35]. In order to model non-Newtonian, sticky liquids, we created a variant of the
basic SPH liquid described so far, which implements particle stickiness by damping the
normal and parallel components of velocity for particles that are in collision with solid
obstacles (Fig 3C, rightmost panel), where ‘normal’ and ‘parallel’ are with respect to
the obstacles surface. Due to the computational demands of running a wide range of
fluid simulations, we only considered two sets of sticky parameter values, chosen by
hand a priori to qualitatively match the visual behavior of the stimuli as closely as
possible (details below). The values for the two stickiness parameters varied slightly
between Experiment 1 and 2, because in Experiment 2, we made the honey somewhat
less viscous than in Experiment 1. The space of possible sticky SPH liquids could in
theory be further explored by varying the viscosity in combination with the two
parameters controlling the velocity damping. In fact, the full parameter space could be
considered as having five parameters (N , ζ, α, and normal and parallel components of
damping during collision), but note that adding stickiness to low-viscosity fluids makes
little physical sense, as the particles can slide easily past each other compared to more
viscous fluids. The result would be largely the same as water, but there would be a
layer of particles left stuck to obstacles. This behavior bears little resemblance to any
known liquid. Thus, we deem the chosen fixed values to be a sufficient starting point,
and distinguish sticky and non-sticky liquids as separate models for the purposes of
presentation. All analysis below involving the sticky liquid (”Model 1 honey”; see
below) will use these fixed parameter values for α and stickiness.
The above model parameters fall into two categories: those that control the fidelity
of simulation (σ, N) and those that determine the physics of the liquid (ζ, α, particle
stickiness). Settings for these parameters are discussed below, in Intuitive fluids engine
parameters.
MarbleSim. We explored another physically-based, but computationally
less-demanding simulator, which was akin to representing the fluid as a handful of
marbles. This simulator, which we call “MarbleSim”, is identical to the IFE in that it
instantiates particles to represent the fluid. However, MarbleSim replaces the SPH
forces with rigid-body interaction rules that are standard in rigid-body physics engines.
This reduces computational complexity (and simulation time), because there are many
fewer pairwise interactions to calculate between particles. In MarbleSim, each particle is
represented as a solid sphere that collides inelastically with obstacles and other particles.
The IFE simulator also instantiates particles as rigid spheres, but is different in that it
ignores particle-particle collisions, allowing them to pass through each other. (Note,
however, that the SPH forces will generally prevent particles from getting arbitrarily
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close.) Thus, particle-obstacle interactions are identical in both the IFE and MarbleSim,
but particle-particle interactions in MarbleSim do not involve SPH forces–particles
instead collide with each other as rigid bodies, similarly to the way marbles would. All
collisions are perfectly inelastic (i.e. particles do not bounce) in both MarbleSim and
the IFE, as this is most consistent with the behavior of liquids.
While particles in MarbleSim have a friction parameter that controls how easily they
slide past each other when they touch, this is not analogous to the particle friction in
the IFE (α). Furthermore, this parameter has very little effect on the simulation
outcomes in our setting. In addition, stickiness, which we employ in SPH simulations,
would make little physical sense in MarbleSim, since the particles easily roll past each
other, rather than cohering together as a continuous substance. The result is
qualitatively similar in behavior to simulations without stickiness, but varies in outcome
because of the layer of stuck particles “left behind” on the obstacles. Thus, similar to
the case of sticky, low-viscosity liquids addressed above, a “sticky marble” simulation
bears little resemblance to the behavior of either water or honey. However, MarbleSim
was still allowed to vary along two dimensions, N and ζ, which exactly match the
corresponding parameters in the IFE, and were allowed to vary along the same ranges of
values. Also, we found that performance of the model improved when adding
uncertainty over damping, as we did with the IFE. The results reported below use the
same value for σ as the uncertain IFE.
Heuristic simulation
SimpleSim. We also explored a simpler kind of dynamic simulation, which is
comparable to the analogical models of [23] in the way it uses a set of deterministic,
recursive heuristics to form predictions. These heuristic rules are inspired by physics
but are not in any formal correspondence to physical dynamics. We add to these rules
notions of noise and momentum to produce a range of different “fluids”. This model
class, which we call “SimpleSim”, instantiates equally-spaced “particles” along the
midline of the liquid’s starting position and generates a path straight downward (in the
direction of gravity). In the model’s simplest form, when an obstacle is encountered, the
path continues along the obstacle surface until it can go straight down again. The
direction to travel along the obstacle’s surface (left or right) is chosen to follow the local
gradient downward, with gravity (see Fig 4A). For example, if the polygon edge that the
particle collides with slopes down and to the right, the particle trajectory continues
down and to the right along the surface. However, the model also includes two degrees
of freedom that allow it to deviate from this basic behavior. The first parameter is a
‘global’ noise parameter, g (ranging from 0 to 1), that controls the probability of
choosing the “wrong” direction when a particle encounters an obstacle, such that the
particle travels initially travels against gravity. For example, if the colliding edge has a
negative slope (down and to the right), the model may randomly choose to continue up
and to the left instead of down and to the right (see Fig 4B, right panel). A particle
makes this decision about whether to initially travel with or against gravity once per
obstacle, upon initial collision, and then continues in that same direction until it reaches
the obstacle’s edge. The second parameter, m (ranging from 0 to 0.2), is somewhat akin
to momentum: a particle does not immediately drop straight down upon reaching the
edge of an obstacle. Rather, it continues for a fixed distance in the same direction it
was traveling, before dropping straight down (see Fig 4B, left panel). The parameter
value specifies the magnitude of this distance. Intuitively, when m is smaller, the model
should make predictions closer to honey, which clings more to the obstacles, and when it
is larger, the model should make predictions closer to water, which sloshes off with some
momentum. Both parameters were discretized to 11 evenly-spaced values, and thus we
calculated predictions for 121 total parameter settings. The value of m corresponded to
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the extra distance (in meters) traveled in the horizontal direction (orthogonal to
gravity). We chose m to correspond to the horizontal distance, instead of absolute
distance, in order to mirror real Newtonian physics, which separates vector quantities,
such as momentum, into orthogonal components. Finally, we found that adding
additional uncertainty over m, in the same way as we did for the IFE and MarbleSim,
modestly improved fits with the data. See Results for details.
The model’s predictions were calculated by counting the number of “particles” that
end up on each side of the divider (or in the cup, for Experiment 2), as in the
simulation models. The model reported here used 100 particles, but the results do not
depend crucially on the exact number of particles, as the particles’ trajectories are
completely independent and do not interfere with each other.
Models without dynamics
We contrasted the simulation-based models above with two alternatives that did not
explicitly seek to simulate dynamic fluid motion: one (the “gravity heuristic”) that is
still in a sense a simulation model, but which runs a purely geometric simulation,
embodying the heuristic notion that gravity pulls all liquid particles down unless an
object blocks their path; and another that used a deep convolutional neural
network [36,37] trained on thousands of examples similar to our experimental test
conditions to predict the task target as a pattern recognition problem.
Both of these alternatives are highly specialized to the particular task studied, and
are unlikely to generalize to liquid motion in even slightly different conditions (e.g.,
different obstacle arrangements, different liquid properties), in contrast to the models
above which ought to generalize whenever the underlying physics being modeled is
shared. However, they represent reasonable and well-known competing perspectives on
the general mechanisms of human perception and cognition [38,39], and offer
advantages such as simplicity of computation and straightforward statements about the
learning processes.
Gravity heuristic. Formally this model corresponds simply to the SimpleSim model
with m = 0 and g = 0. With these parameters set to null values, the model simply
follows the geometry of the obstacles, and it makes the same predictions regardless of
the liquid type. Thus, it may be considered a simple, geometric heuristic, formalizing
the prediction that particles should continue to “go down” under gravity, without
penetrating obstacles or showing any momentum and the dynamics that come from that.
CA B
Fig 4. Gravity heuristic. (A) Each panel depicts the path of a different particle. (B)
Depiction of ‘momentum’ (left) for m = 0.1, and ‘global noise’ with g 6= 0 (right), for a single
particle that has chosen the “wrong” direction (going against gravity). See text for details. (C )
Visualization of model from Gardin and Meltzer (1989). The simulated fluid (blue cubes)
travels straight down under gravity, which is analogous to A.
Convolutional networks. As an alternative to explicit physical representations of
liquid dynamics, we also tested the possibility that people might be responding based on
September 6, 2018 11/30
a simpler mapping between visual input and physical outcome, learned from experience
using purely visual features of static scenes. Our models are intended to capture only
quick, bottom-up, visually guided intuitions that people might have developed from
experience. We implemented a deep learning model, replacing the top layer of a widely
used convolutional neural network [36], pre-trained on a very large collection of images,
with a linear output layer, and performing backpropagation [37] until convergence to
learn a regression from images to labels in a supervised fashion. We trained separate
networks for water and honey outcomes in each experiment, and refer to each as “water
ConvNet” and “honey ConvNet”, respectively. The dataset for the water ConvNet in
each experiment consisted of 10,000 randomly generated scenes, with target values in
the range [0, 1] that corresponded to the proportion of water that went to the right bin
in Experiment 1, or in the cup in Experiment 2 (as determined by a deterministic
ground truth simulation with N = 100). The network was not shown any intermediate
fluid positions. The honey ConvNet in each experiment was trained by fine-tuning the
water model using ∼2500 training examples. All networks were trained in layer-wise
stages to minimize overfitting, freezing all layers below layer n, for n = [N, . . . , 1], where
N is the total number of layers. That is, the first training stage freezes all but the last
layer, the second stage freezes all but the last two layers, etc. In addition, we augmented
our training data with versions of the original images zoomed by random amounts.
Experiment 1
Participants
All participants (N=65) were recruited from MIT Brain and Cognitive Sciences’ human
participants database (composed of roughly half MIT students and employees, and half
local community members). All gave informed consent, were treated according to
protocol approved by MIT’s IRB, and were compensated $10/h for participation. All
experimental sessions were one hour long, and each participant ran in one session in one
experiment. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Stimuli were presented on a
liquid-crystal display, which participants free-viewed from a distance of 0.5-0.75 m.
They indicated their responses by depressing a key on the keyboard, or by adjusting the
computer mouse and then clicking to lock in their choice.
Stimuli and procedure
In order to test people’s ability to predict the behavior of a liquid, participants were
presented with 120 virtual scenes, simulated in 3 dimensions (including depth into the
screen), with a simulated size of 1.0 m x 1.50 m. The scenes depicted a cylindrical
volume (diameter equal to 0.148 m) of liquid positioned above a randomly generated
obstacle course composed of fixed, solid objects and asked to predict what fraction of
the liquid would flow into each basin below the obstacles under gravity. Participants
were randomly assigned to one of two groups: one group was presented with a
low-viscosity, water-like liquid (Experiment 1a), the other with a high-viscosity,
honey-like liquid (Experiment 1b). The scenes’ geometries were automatically generated
as described below. During practice trials (see below), participants viewed videos of the
simulated liquid falling under gravity, rendered at 30 Hz using Blender’s
(www.blender.org) Cycles ray-tracer. All moving liquid videos were simulated using
Blender’s Lattice-Boltzmann liquid simulator (see Appendix A for simulation details).
Lattice-Boltzmann methods are very different from SPH, a choice intended to eliminate
the possibility that our model would only capture people’s judgments because the
scenes were generated using a similar fluid simulation algorithm. All participants were
presented with the same, randomly shuffled scene order. The 120 trials were divided
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into three blocks of 40, with a short break in between. Both Experiments 1a and 1b
included a practice and test phase.
On each trial (in both practice and test phases), participants viewed an image of the
scene, with the liquid in its starting position. They were instructed to predict the
proportion of liquid that would end up on each side of the divider (see the dark wedge
at the bottom of the stimuli in Fig 2A), and to indicate their judgment by moving a
virtual slider with the mouse left or right, then pressing ENTER to submit. [See online
supplementary material for stimuli videos.]
During the practice phase, comprised of 15 trials, participants received visual
feedback after submitting their response on each trial. During feedback, subjects saw a
rendered video of the liquid flowing through the obstacles (4 seconds for water and 10
seconds for honey; made in Blender, as described above). The practice phase was
designed to familiarize participants with the characteristics of the liquid and the
response procedure.
Random scene generation The obstacles in the test scenes were generated
automatically by first dividing a plane into polygonal cells using 2D Voronoi tessellation,
then selecting a random subset as solid obstacles such that the total area approximately
summed to 0.12 m2. Coarse SPH simulations were run to filter out those scenes in
which liquid particles remained trapped in obstacle concavities or had little interaction
with the obstacles.
Intuitive fluids engine parameters We partition the parameter space into three
distinct classes of liquids–non-sticky (“water”), sticky (“Model 1 honey”), and
highly-damped (“Model 2 honey”; see below). The water and honey classes correspond
to the liquids in Experiments 1a and 1b, respectively. For the water IFE we explored
particle friction values of α = {0.01, 0.2, 2}. The Model 1 honey IFE used α = 1.25 for
Experiment 1 and α = 2 for Experiment 2. (As mentioned above, the Model 1 honey
liquids also involved two extra parameters controlling stickiness, which were fixed a
priori to qualitatively match the stimuli in honey trials of each experiment,
respectively.) In total, the IFE has six sub-models: water, Model 1 honey, Model 2
honey, which could all be either deterministic or uncertain (by making σ zero or
non-zero). However, we only report results from the uncertain versions of these three
fluid types, as they had slightly higher correlations with the data across most of
parameter space, but maintained the same qualitative trends.
The number of particles used to represent the liquid was varied from 1 to 100.
However, with fewer than 15 particles in our settings, the assumptions of SPH are
violated to an extent that it cannot be considered to be a fluid simulation. We explored
simulations with fewer particles in order to compare their predictions with people, and
found them to have poor fits to the data, and therefore we will not report those results.
With greater than 100 particles, non-sticky simulations converge to very similar
outcomes. The model’s damping parameter was varied from ζ = 0 (no damping) to
ζ = 20 (high damping). The value of σ was 0 (i.e. no uncertainty) for the deterministic
IFE, and 4 for the uncertain IFE (but results were similar for other values). To
compute predictions in the uncertain IFE for a particular value of damping, ζ,
deterministic simulation outcomes were averaged over damping values in the range
[ζ − σ, ζ + σ]. Each model (deterministic and uncertain IFEs) made a single prediction
for each scene and unique setting of fluid parameter values (N , α and particle stickiness,
ζ). The ground truth models corresponded to ζ = 0, σ = 0, and N = 100 (for honey) or
N = 200 (for water). The number of particles for honey ground truth was fewer than
for water because as the number of particles is increased, the fluid behaves as if it were
non-sticky. This is because only the particles in contact with an obstacle have modified
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behavior, and so their impact on the overall dynamics of the fluid diminishes as they
become a smaller proportion of the total number of particles. We chose N = 100 for
ground truth, because during our search for a liquid that qualitatively matched honey
from each of the experiments, this is the number of particles we used. Thus, it is the
closest match we could find to the behavior of the stimulus fluid. Further work should
be dedicated to developing improved simulation methods to more accurately capture the
dynamics of sticky liquids, in a way that is independent of number of particles.
As mentioned above, we explored two alternative models to account for judgments
about honey stimuli. The first (Model 1) simulated honey as a high particle-friction and
particle-stickiness fluid, as described above. The second alternative (Model 2) simply
corresponded to the water IFE with high damping. Thus, Model 2 can be considered a
subspace of the water IFE. It was found empirically that these two models predict
similar outcomes in our tasks, and so we consider each as an alternative cognitive
hypothesis. Model 2 honey may be especially appealing from the standpoint of
representational simplicity, as it replaces multiple parameters related to stickiness and
viscosity with a single parameter, damping.
To avoid over-fitting, in general, we chose parameters based on Experiment 1, and
fixed them to these values for Experiment 2 (see Table 2). Further, we fixed our
parameters in a stratified manner, starting by finding the best value for N , then fixing
N to this value while searching for the best values for α and ζ. More specifically, to
choose N , we took the average between the best-fitting number of particles for
Experiment 1 water trials (with the water IFE) and Experiment 1 honey trials (with the
Model 1 honey IFE), which was N = 50. (Best-fitting values for water and honey trials
independently were N = 25 and N = 75, respectively, but fits were similar across the
range from N = 25 to N = 75 in both models.) With N fixed, we then found the
best-fit α value for the water IFE on Experiment 1a responses. Next, with N and α
fixed, we found the best ζ for the water IFE on Experiment 1a responses. All IFE
models, across both experiments, shared the same N , as found above, and the water
IFE in Experiment 2 inherited its parameters from Experiment 1. Model 1 honey
inherited N and ζ from the water IFE, but used the α that was appropriate for honey.
Model 2 honey inherited N and α from the water IFE, but fit ζ using responses from
Experiment 1b. The final parameter choices for the water IFE were N = 50, α = 0.01,
and ζ = 5. The damping value for Model 2 honey was ζ = 11. Note that α = 0.01 was
also the most physically accurate value of α for water. Finally, also note that there was
no α value to fit for Model 1 honey, as it was not allowed to vary.
Experiment 2
For some model parameter settings in Experiment 1, both water and honey models
made similar predictions, which limited the model’s ability to assess people’s sensitivity
to viscosity and stickiness. In Experiment 2, we designed new stimuli to elicit highly
different outcomes between low- and high-particle-friction and stickiness IFE
simulations. See Fig 5 for examples of Experiment 2’s more strongly contrastive stimuli.
Stimuli and procedure
We generated new random scenes and automatically selected scenes for which the
model’s predictions for honey versus water would be anti-correlated. This would allow
us to more directly examine whether our model could explain people’s sensitivities to
the different liquids’ physical properties. We also modified the task from Experiment 1,
by removing the basin divider and instead placing a cup at the bottom of the scene (see
Fig 2B). Participants judged what percent of the liquid would end up in the cup, which
was a third of the width of the scene, and could be at one of five evenly-spaced locations
September 6, 2018 14/30
Time
C
Time
Time
A
B
Fig 5. Example scenes from Experiment 2 for which water and honey trials had very
different outcomes. (A) A scene in which much more honey flowed into the cup than water.
(B) A scene in which much more water flowed into the cup than honey.
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along the bottom. By varying the cup location and making the width less than the
basins in Experiment 1, we could more easily create strongly anti-correlated scenes.
Each scene consisted of 3 obstacles, which could either be an equilateral triangle, square,
or circle, and varied randomly in size (within a specified range) and position.
All 21 participants saw 120 trials (60 water and 60 honey). Each participant saw the
same 60 scenes for each liquid type, but all honey trials were mirrored with respect to
water, to ensure they weren’t recognized. The honey stimulus in Experiment 2 had a
lower viscosity than that of Experiment 1. (Experiment 1 honey was meant to be as
different as possible from water, to try to elicit different participant responses.
Experiment 2’s honey was designed to be more typical of honey encountered in everyday
situations, to draw on prior knowledge of how it behaves.) The honey model whose
simulation parameters were most closely matched to the stimulus liquid also had a lower
viscosity (α = 1.25) than that of Experiment 1 (α = 2).
Results
Experiment 1
We first asked: How accurate are participants’ predictions about flowing liquids? In all
analyses we calculated the means across participants’ judgments for each scene, and
estimated Pearson correlations between those mean judgments and each model’s
predictions as a measure of how well the model fit the human data.
In Experiment 1a, the correlations between the mean participant responses and the
water and honey ground truth models were r = 0.76[0.74, 0.78] and r = 0.83[0.81, 0.84],
respectively (the interval in brackets is a 95% CI, estimated by a bootstrap analysis
with 10, 000 resamples [40]). This is somewhat surprising because one would expect
water simulations to better account for judgments about water than honey simulations
(see Experiment 2). By contrast, Experiment 1b showed that participants’ judgments
about water and honey were best-explained by their corresponding ground truth models:
r = 0.48[0.43, 0.53] for water ground truth and r = 0.73[0.69, 0.76] for honey ground
truth. Fig 7 summarizes correlations for IFE parameter settings as described in the
previous section.
Importantly, our results show a significant correlation (two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov p < .0001) between individual participants’ judgments and the
ground truth in all our experiments (see Fig 6). The null hypothesis was generated by
drawing random samples from a beta distribution fit to participant data, which
captured the variance of their judgments but not any stimulus-specific structure. This
result shows that participants cannot simply do well by chance.
Next we asked: How well are participants’ judgments explained by the IFE models
versus alternative models? Overall, the results show that the IFE did well in explaining
the data, but we also found that the honey IFEs (and honey ground truth) did
moderately well in accounting for responses on water trials. Thus, from Experiment 1
alone, it is not clear to what extent people were sensitive to the different fluid
properties. In addition, our alternative models also performed moderately well in some
cases, compared to the IFE. Experiment 2 addresses both of these issues. Experiment 1
scenes were not designed to guarantee that honey and water resulted in very different
outcomes, and thus responses for water versus honey in many scenes should be similar.
In Experiment 2, we design scenes for which water and honey simulations have
maximally different outcomes, and therefore, if people’s predictions are sensitive to
different liquid properties, we should be able to detect this. Furthermore, the
Experiment 2 scenes are a more stringent test of the alternative models, whose physics
do not as closely match the ground truths for water or honey as the IFE’s does.
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Exp. 1
Data (water trials) Data (honey trials) Ground (water) Ground (honey)
Water ConvNet 0.76[0.74, 0.78] 0.52[0.46, 0.56] 0.91 0.69
Honey ConvNet 0.85[0.83, 0.86] 0.70[0.65, 0.74] 0.76 0.82
Water SimpleSim 0.75[0.73, 0.77] 0.66[0.62, 0.71] 0.56 0.60
Honey SimpleSim 0.68[0.66, 0.70] 0.76[0.73, 0.80] 0.38 0.60
Water MarbleSim 0.88[0.86, 0.89] 0.76[0.72, 0.79] 0.79 0.78
Honey MarbleSim 0.83[0.81, 0.84] 0.84[0.81, 0.87] 0.60 0.78
Gravity heuristic 0.58[0.55, 0.60] 0.73[0.70, 0.77] 0.19 0.53
Table 1. Correlations between alternative models and subject data and the ground truth predictions
Correlations between the data in Experiment 1a and uncertain IFE were
r = 0.92[0.91, 0.93], r = 0.76[0.74, 0.78], and r = 0.81[0.79, 0.82] for water, Model 1
honey, and Model 2 honey, respectively. Experiment 1b had correlations of
r = 0.74[0.71, 0.78], r = 0.79[0.76, 0.83], and r = 0.86[0.83, 0.88] for water, Model 1
honey, and Model 2 honey, respectively. Fig 9 summarizes how IFE fits vary across
different values of ζ and α.
The IFE outperformed all alternative models in Experiment 1a, but was slightly
outperformed by MarbleSim in Experiment 1b. MarbleSim was also highly competitive
in water trials. SimpleSim was somewhat competitive in water trials and highly
competitive in honey trials, and the gravity heuristic was competitive on honey trials,
but less competitive in water trials. Table 1 summarizes the numerical results of the
alternative models, which are also depicted visually in Fig 7C (with the exception of the
gravity heuristic, which is shown in Fig 8). Table 1 also summarizes the agreements
between alternative models and the ground truth predictions for each liquid.
MarbleSim’s best-fitting parameter values for water and honey trials respectively
were (N = 25, ζ = 2) and (N = 75, ζ = 6). Both N and ζ were fit independently for
water versus honey trials. We will refer to these best-fit parameter values as “water
MarbleSim” and “honey MarbleSim”, respectively. SimpleSim’s best-fitting parameter
values for water and honey trials respectively were (g = 0.1, m = 0.1) and (g = 0.0,
m = 0.04). Both g and m were fit independently for water versus honey trials. We will
refer to these best-fit parameter values as “water SimpleSim” and “honey SimpleSim”,
respectively. To implement SimpleSim’s uncertainty over m, which was analogous to the
IFE’s and MarbleSim’s uncertainty over ζ, we average model predictions over the range
[m− σm,m+ σm], where σm/(mmax −mmin) = σ/(ζmax − ζmin), and max and min
represent the maximum and minimum values explored for those parameters. Thus, since
mmin = 0, mmax = 0.2, ζmin = 0, ζmax = 20, and σ = 4, then σm = 0.04. Here, we only
report results for this value of σm.
The ConvNet was initially trained on the Experiment 1a ground truth (“water
ConvNet”), and a separate model (“honey ConvNet”) was then made by fine-tuning the
original network on a smaller number of honey ground truth simulations, in order to
better capture human judgments on Experiment 1b. As seen in Table 1, the water
ConvNet successfully learned to approximate ground truth predictions, but its
correlation with people in water trials was comparable to ground truth itself. The honey
ConvNet was less successful in learning the ground truth, but its correlations with
people in Experiment 1b were also comparable to those with the ground truth. Like
with the honey ground truth, the honey ConvNet’s predictions were highly correlated
with people in Experiment 1a. Experiment 2 further addresses this issue, by
establishing whether people actually make different predictions for water and honey.
We also found hints that people’s predictions were sensitive to the physical
attributes of the liquids, which could be predicted by the IFE. In both Experiment 1a
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and 1b, participants were at least partially sensitive to the physical attributes of
viscosity and stickiness of each liquid: the ground truth model whose particle friction
and stickiness corresponded to Experiment 1a was a better fit to Experiment 1a’s
participants’ responses than those of Experiment 1b (see Fig 7). Experiment 1b’s
participants’ responses were better fit by the ground truth model with Experiment 1b’s
physical attributes. However, the fit between Experiment 1a responses and the honey
ground truth was quite high, an issue which we address in Experiment 2.
In both experiments, including damping in the simulation models improved fits with
people’s judgments. Furthermore, the uncertain IFE model had modestly higher
correlations in most cases than the deterministic IFE (results not presented here).
However, future work should further investigate the role of uncertainty in this kind of
task. We also tested our previously presented uncertainty model [34], which assumed
veridical physics plus uncertainty about the initial location of the fluid. We found this
model to be more consistent with the data than ground truth, but it did not account as
well for the data as either the deterministic or uncertain damped IFE models we present
here.
In Experiment 1a, split-half correlations reveal participants were highly consistent
with each other (r = 0.96[0.94, 0.97]). Experiment 1b participants were less consistent
with each other (r = 0.81[0.73, 0.86]) than Experiment 1a, which might be attributable
to less familiarity with the liquid, since Experiment 1a participants saw a liquid that
behaved similarly to real water, but the liquid in Experiment 1b, while comparable to a
highly viscous honey, was less similar to most common liquids. In addition, real honey
has highly variable viscosity, so any experience people have with honey is less consistent
than with water.
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Fig 6. Distribution of individual participant correlations with ground truth (dark colors)
versus the null hypothesis (light colors).
Experiment 2
Our results show that people’s judgments on trials of a particular fluid type were
positively correlated with the appropriate model, and near zero or anti-correlated with
the other fluid type (see Fig 7B).
Correlations with the IFE model were calculated using the same model parameters
from Experiment 1. The correlations for participants on water trials were
r = 0.57[0.48, 0.64] with the water IFE, r = −0.10[−0.20, 0.01] with the Model 1 honey
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Fig 7. Correlations between mean participant data and all models that make different
predictions for water versus honey trials (in both experiments). A and B show the IFE models
and ground truth, while C and D show the alternative models (ConvNet, MarbleSim, and
SimpleSim). The alternative models exclude the gravity heuristic, as it makes the same
predictions for both water and honey. In Experiment 2, the bars with small or negative values
(in B) establish that participants’ responses are sensitive to the stickiness and viscosity of a
liquid. Model 1 and Model 2 refer to the two different versions of IFE honey. Model 1 simulates
honey as a fluid with high particle friction and stickiness, while Model 2 simulates honey as
water with high damping. Summary of parameters for all models are found in Table 2.
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Fig 8. Comparison of the best-fitting versions of the IFE model and alternative models. All
bars for the IFE, MarbleSim, SimpleSim, and ConvNet are identical to their corresponding
bars in Fig 7, and their values are given in Table 2.
Model N α ζ σ sticky m g
Water IFE 50 0.01 5 4 No N/A N/A
Honey 1 IFE 50 1.25(Exp. 1)/2.0(Exp. 2) 5 4 Yes N/A N/A
Honey 2 IFE 50 1.25(Exp. 1)/2.0(Exp. 2) 11 4 No N/A N/A
Water MarbleSim 25 N/A 2 4 No N/A N/A
Honey MarbleSim 75 N/A 6 4 No N/A N/A
Ground truth water 200 0.01 0 0 No N/A N/A
Ground truth honey 100 1.25(Exp. 1)/2.0(Exp. 2) 0 0 Yes N/A N/A
Water SimpleSim N/A N/A N/A 4 N/A 0.1 0.1
Honey SimpleSim N/A N/A N/A 4 N/A 0.04 0.0
Gravity heuristic N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.0 0.0
ConvNet N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Table 2. Summary of the model parameters used in figures 6 and 7. The same set of parameters was used to model both
experiments (with the exception of α in IFE honey models, which was fixed a priori).
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Fig 9. Uncertain IFE performance across a range of α and damping values at 50 particles.
Results are qualitatively similar to the deterministic IFE, but with higher correlations.
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Exp. 2
Data (water trials) Data (honey trials) Ground (water) Ground (honey)
Water ConvNet 0.46[0.36, 0.55] -0.56[-0.62, -0.51] 0.91 -0.49
Honey ConvNet 0.13[0.03, 0.23] -0.00[-0.08, 0.07] 0.05 0.15
Water SimpleSim 0.22[0.12, 0.32] 0.58[0.52, 0.64] -0.40 0.49
Honey SimpleSim -0.06[-0.16, 0.05] 0.78[0.74, 0.82] -0.76 0.70
Water MarbleSim 0.56[0.48, 0.64] -0.16[-0.23, -0.09] 0.56 -0.08
Honey MarbleSim 0.33[0.23, 0.42] 0.41[0.35, 0.47] -0.09 0.54
Gravity heuristic -0.22[-0.32, -0.12] 0.79[0.74, 0.83] -0.89 0.81
Table 3. Correlations between alternative models and subject data and the ground truth predictions
IFE and r = 0.08[−0.03, 0.19] with Model 2 honey IFE. On honey trials, correlations
were r = 0.00[−0.07, 0.08] with the water IFE, r = 0.81[0.77, 0.85] with the Model 1
honey IFE, and r = 0.82[0.78, 0.86] with Model 2 honey IFE. Correlations with ground
truth for water trials were r = 0.41[0.35, 0.47] and r = −0.03[−0.08, 0.03] for water and
honey respectively. Correlations with ground truth for honey trials were
r = −0.69[−0.71,−0.68] and r = 0.69[0.68, 0.7] for water and Model 1 honey
respectively.
As shown in Fig 8, the gravity heuristic and SimpleSim accounted just as well for
honey trial data as the honey IFE models, but were not as well correlated with water
trials. Numerical results for all alternative models are also summarized in Table 3, and
visualized in Fig 7D. Parameters for MarbleSim and SimpleSim were fixed to their
corresponding values in Experiment 1. Results show that, in contrast to Experiment 1,
MarbleSim did poorly on honey trials and SimpleSim did poorly on water trials,
compared to the IFE.
As in Experiment 1, the ConvNet model was trained initially on water trials, and
then fine-tuned on a smaller number of honey trials, resulting in two separate networks.
(Note that separate networks needed to be trained for Experiment 2, because there was
a cup rather than a divider at the bottom.) The ConvNet results are shown in Table 3.
Like Experiment 1, the water ConvNet was quite successful in predicting ground-truth
physics, but its correlation with the water trial responses were still lower than the water
IFE. By contrast, the honey ConvNet was not as successful in predicting the ground
truth on our stimuli. We believe that this is because the scenes we picked as stimuli
were not drawn from the same distribution as those in the ConvNet training set.
Specifically, the stimuli were drawn from a skewed distribution, which filtered for scenes
with highly divergent outcomes for water versus honey, whereas the training set as a
whole was not. We believe this problem did not affect the water ConvNet as much,
because of differences in behavior between the water and honey. Honey may exhibit
different “regimes” of behavior: if only a low proportion of the particles get stuck on an
obstacle surface, the simulation may have a very different outcome than if slightly more
particles get stuck. It is possible that with a very large training set, the network would
be more accurate on our honey stimuli. However, we stopped seeing incremental
improvement when the honey ConvNet test set (in both experiments) included more
than about 25% of the full set of 10000 training examples.
The results of Experiment 2 show that people are sensitive to the physical
parameters (both stickiness and viscosity) of each fluid. Furthermore, our data show
that people can accommodate their predictions systematically to different fluids with
different physical parameters, but they may do so in one of two ways: by adjusting
parameters in the simulation corresponding roughly to the physics, like stickiness and
viscosity, or by approximating these physical variations using a single simple parameter,
damping. The latter is cognitively appealing for its representational simplicity, but
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needs further investigation as a candidate cognitive model.
But while participants had good fits with both honey IFE models on honey trials,
the water IFE model’s fit to participants’ responses was significantly lower than in the
previous experiment, and responses were less accurate with respect to ground truth. In
addition, subjects’ split-half correlations were much lower (r = 0.72[0.53, 0.82], as
compared to r = 0.96[0.94, 0.97] in Experiment 1 water trials, r = 0.81[0.73, 0.86] in
Experiment 1 honey trials, and r = 0.87[0.81, 0.92] in Experiment 2 honey trials). One
potential explanation of this performance gap is that the task was more intrinsically
difficult, as the cup was less wide than each bin in Experiment 1. That is, Experiment 2
scenes may require more precision in simulation (i.e. more samples) to match the
accuracy levels in Experiment 1. As a measure of how much precision was required, we
compared IFE prediction variance across tasks. That is, we looked at the deterministic
IFE predictions over a range of ζ values to see how much they varied. If there is high
variance, it means the model is less “certain” of the outcome, and therefore the task is
more difficult. The ranges of ζ examined were the same as those used by the uncertain
IFE in the results presented above (i.e. 1 ≤ ζ ≤ 9 for water and Model 1 honey,
7 ≤ ζ ≤ 15 for Model 2 honey). Table 4 shows the mean variance across scenes for each
experiment and IFE fluid type. The mean variance for water in Experiment 2 was
significantly higher than the mean variances for the other two IFE models in both
experiments (unpaired t-test, all p-values near zero), supporting the notion that
Experiment 2 water stimuli were intrinsically more difficult than the other three tasks.
(Note that the human performance was higher on Experiment 1 (both water and honey
trials) and Experiment 2 honey trials, but lower on Experiment 2 water trials,
qualitatively matching the pattern of model variances.) However, further work will be
necessary to understand why the model had higher agreement with ground truth in
Experiment 2 water trials than human responses.
Water Honey (Model 1) Honey (Model 2)
Experiment 1 0.003[0.003, 0.003] 0.002[0.002, 0.002] 0.003[0.003, 0.004]
Experiment 2 0.014[0.013, 0.016] 0.001[0.001, 0.001] 0.009[0.008, 0.010]
Table 4. IFE variance across experiments.
Discussion
Here we introduced the first computational cognitive model of how humans judge fluid
dynamics in complex everyday settings. Our proposed model, the “Intuitive Fluids
Engine” (IFE), holds that humans run particle-based simulations to predict how a fluid
will flow in the world. Our experimental results show that humans are able to make
coarse, but often accurate, predictions about fluid dynamics, which are best explained
by the IFE, compared to several alternatives, including coarser simulation as well as
models that do not explicitly simulate liquid dynamics. In two experiments, we found
that people were able to predict fluid flow in a range of novel environments with
multiple obstacles, varied fluid properties, and different task dynamics. Their
predictions demonstrated that they could take the complex geometric structure into
account, as well as fluid properties such as stickiness and viscosity, and these
phenomena were captured by our IFE model. Solving these prediction tasks accurately
would be very computationally intensive even for an agent with perfect knowledge of the
ground truth physics, and our model explains the difference between ground truth
accuracy and human performance as resulting from limited numbers of particles used to
represent the fluid, from a damping term that modulated the momentum of the
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simulated particles, and from imperfect approximations to the physics inherent to all
particle-based simulators. Together people’s general competence and their adherence to
our model’s predictions are consistent with the theory that important aspects of human
physical scene understanding can be accounted for by cognitive mechanisms of
approximate probabilistic simulation [3], and extends this thesis to the more complex
and under-studied domain of how humans understand and interact with fluids.
A crucial feature of our IFE model is how coarsely it approximates the true physics
of fluids. Though our particle-based model is in the same family as SPH methods used
for approximate simulations in physics, engineering, computer graphics and video games,
its details and implementation differ importantly from those used in other disciplines.
The rules that govern the particle-particle and particle-rigid interactions, the
parameters of the simulated materials, and the granularity of the mass density
approximation are highly simplified relative to those used in typical engineering
applications, in ways that render the simulation non-veridical even though it still looks
reasonably natural. In particular, very small numbers of particles, by the standards of
typical SPH methods (e.g., 50 in our model, versus the hundreds of thousands or
millions of particles typical in graphics and engineering, or the thousands typical in
video games), gave the best fit to people’s judgments. And when simulating viscous
fluids, a variant of our model that lumps various “stickiness” parameters into a single
damping parameter fits human judgments well compared to the variant that keeps them
separate. Though it requires further exploration, representational simplifications like
these may point toward ways that human minds simulate complex real-world physics
with cognitively plausible and efficient computations.
The only exception to the general pattern of agreement between physical simulation
and people’s judgments occurred in the ”Water” condition of Experiment 2, where a
minority of participants had no correlation with ground truth. Our analyses showed
that trials in this condition were objectively more difficult for a simulation-based
approach than those in other conditions, but it is also possible that there are interesting
qualitative differences between these trials to be explored further. Future work should
more systematically investigate people’s patterns of success and failures in predicting
qualitatively different kinds of fluid motion, and we expect that this will yield more
insights into the nature of the computations and representations that people use in
predicting fluid flow.
A common critique of quantitative simulation-based cognitive models of intuitive
physics [25,41] is they are impractical or unrealistic, due to the computation costs and
the detailed physical knowledge implicitly embedded in these simulation algorithms.
The simulation-based model we propose here should alleviate some of these concerns:
Even extremely simplified simulations, with very coarse physical approximations, can
nonetheless capture the fluid dynamics well enough for everyday judgment purposes. At
the same time, these models can capture to a reasonable extent the surprisingly
accurate quantitative predictions of fluid flow that people are able to make.
The alternative models we presented aimed to provide a benchmark, against which
to compare the performance of our IFE results. We explored simpler, particle-based
simulation models, and found that they captured certain aspects of people’s judgments,
but no single model could account as fully for people’s predictions as the IFE.
Nonetheless, simpler simulation models can do reasonably well here, which suggests that
the brain may implement something not quite as sophisticated as our IFE. Taken
together, the success of our IFE and alternative simulation models provides strong
evidence for relatively sophisticated mental simulation in people’s heads, but point
toward the need to further explore simpler simulation alternatives that are still
sophisticated enough to account for the wide range of accurate predictions that people
can make.
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Our SimpleSim model performed especially well on honey trials in both experiments,
achieving correlations similar to those of the IFE. A possible explanation for this
success is that honey is an easier fluid to simulate heuristically. Supporting this notion,
SimpleSim in Experiment 2 had a maximum correlation with the honey ground truth of
r = 0.80 (occurring at g = 0.1, m = 0.06), but with the water ground truth, the
maximum correlation was just r = 0.20 (occurring at g = 0.0, m = 0.2). (Recall that
Experiment 2 scenes were specifically designed to elicit different outcomes for water
versus honey, and are thus the best test of whether any parameter setting of SimpleSim
could approximate water, as compared to honey.) This result makes intuitive sense,
since both real honey and particles in SimpleSim tend to fall straight down near obstacle
edges, by contrast to water, which splashes energetically, in different and less predictable
directions. We believe that the moderate success of the heuristic simulation model can
be attributed in part to the above: it is intrinsically well-suited for simulating sticky,
viscous liquids falling under gravity. SimpleSim’s relative success in Experiment 1 water
trials can largely be attributed to its close agreement with honey ground truth physics,
since honey ground truth and honey IFE also had high correlations with those trials.
Thus, the real test of whether SimpleSim is a good model for water trials is Experiment
2, where it does poorly relative to water IFE, water ground truth, and water MarbleSim.
We also explored a non-simulation, neural network model that learned a fast
mapping between images of the starting configurations and the numerical outcomes.
First, our neural network model shows that it is possible for a connectionist architecture
to learn an accurate mapping from a still image representing initial conditions to a
single number representing the simulated outcome for our task. Since our networks were
trained on ground truth physics, they learned close approximations to the ground truth.
It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that they had similar correlations with human data
compared to the ground truth simulations. If people learn a similar kind of fast
mapping between starting conditions and final outcomes, our results suggest there may
be other biases or constraints involved, which we have not captured here. (We also
tested whether any intermediate points in training, prior to convergence, resulted in
higher correlations with subjects, and found this not to be the case).
Previous AI models for explicit reasoning about fluids (e.g. [18–21], [23]) have been
studied in fundamentally different contexts than those we examined here. For
example, [19] and [20] assume laminar flow that is highly constrained by container
geometry (e.g. a piston cylinder). These models were designed to answer binary
questions (Is the fluid flowing up or down? Is pressure increasing or decreasing?), rather
than to predict the location of liquid during or after a splash. It is not clear how such
qualitative or logical modeling approaches could be adapted to the present experiment,
which involves fluids in rapid dynamical flow, or whether they could capture our
participants’ quantitative judgments, but this is an important topic for future work.
Perhaps the most similar previous model is [23], which could be seen as a simpler
particle-based approach and in part motivated the gravity heuristic and SimpleSim
models here. Their approach may be adaptable to the present experiments, but it is not
immediately clear how to modify it such that it could distinguish between different
liquids, such as water and honey.
Future work should explore how the precision, temporal duration, and other
structural and parametric features of mental simulation for fluids might be implemented.
For example, how does the precision vary as a function of how far into the future one
must mentally simulate? [42] showed that for stability judgments, where the question is
how far a fluid-containing vessel can be tilted before the fluid spills out and only
one-time step predictions are needed (in contrast to our judgments here which required
looking ahead many time-steps), IFE models can be extremely quantitatively accurate
as accounts of people’s judgments. How closely do the attributes represented by the
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mind correspond to the actual physical characteristics of a liquid? Physically accurate
simulation models can account for people’s judgments, but we also showed that a
simpler simulation model (SimpleSim) also did reasonably well, even if the more
physically accurate simulation models did better overall. This raises the question as to
whether other simple simulation models may do better than SPH in accounting for
people’s judgments.
Can our general approach extend to capture other classes of physical intuitions that
go beyond rigid-body dynamics? Particle-based models can provide reasonable
simulations for liquids and gases, as well as collections of solid elements (e.g., piles of
sand) and composite materials (e.g., mashed potatoes or Play-Doh) whose dynamics
share similarities with liquids. In fact, work by [43] provides preliminary evidence that
particle-based simulation models can capture people’s judgments about sand in a very
similar task to the one we present here. What are the limits of simulation-based
models–what kinds of non-rigid dynamics can people make coherent predictions about,
and might some be better explained by alternative approaches such as qualitative
reasoning? Do people begin to use some form of qualitative reasoning as simulation
becomes too computationally demanding or in situations where they have insufficient
prior experience? There is evidence that internal forward models in the motor system
are involved in predicting dynamics that cannot be reenacted by the body [44], which
might help explain how mental simulations are implemented. Establishing connections
between such work and our approximate simulation framework could lead to a deeper
understanding of people’s capabilities and limitations when simulating physics.
Another important question is: How could intuitive physics engines be represented
in the brain? [45] report fMRI evidence for physics-specific processing in an array of
cortical regions related to the ”multiple demand” system. But no models yet have
connected the computational models to their neural substrates. Inspired by the recent
successes of deep learning approaches in AI, a plausible candidate might be a recurrent
neural network with dynamic, parallel, and distributed structure [46]. To date, neural
network models have only been able to capture simple and restricted classes of
rigid-body dynamics [24,47], but as work on multimodal image annotation, linguistic
modeling, and more general purpose distributed algorithm learning systems (e.g.,
LSTMs [48,49], the “Neural Turing Machine” [50]) advances, more richly structured
scenes and physical dynamics might become accessible to these frameworks. A more
general question for development, and computational cognitive psychologists is: Where
does people’s knowledge of liquids come from? Five month-olds can distinguish between
solids and liquids in novel contexts after observing their distinct patterns of
movement [51,52], which suggests either a very data-efficient experience-based learning
process or innate biases. Perhaps our simulation-based model’s core components can be
measured in young children, or its more complex features can be observed as they
emerge and mature.
Conclusion
Approximate simulation is a powerful framework that may explain how people
understand a wide variety of complex physical processes they encounter in everyday life,
such as rigids, non-rigids, and fluids. This work offers the first computational model of
how people make intuitive predictions about fluids, and provides evidence that a
particle-based simulation model can account for human predictions about liquids with
different substance attributes.
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Supporting information
S1 Appendix. Simulation in Blender The stimuli in both experiments used
Blender’s (www.blender.org) lattice-Boltzman liquid simulator. All simulations used a
grid resolution of 300 and 100 tracer particles. The water stimuli used Blender’s preset
kinematic viscosity of 1.000 centiPoise. The honey stimuli had a kinematic viscosity of
100.0 cP in Experiment 1 and 2.000 cP in Experiment 2. All other simulation settings
were left to their default values (Real World Size: 0.5 meters; Grid Levels: -1;
Compressibility: 0.005; Slip Type: Free Slip; Surface Smoothness: 1.000; Surface
Subdivisions: 0). Despite being set to free slip, the simulations at high viscosity liquid
exhibited adhesive effects. The liquids were rendered using a Mix Shader with 0.05
fraction Diffuse BSDF (Roughness: 0.000) and Beckmann Glass BSDF (Roughness:
0.061, IOR: 1.330).
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